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INTRODUCTION:
On March 6, 2018, Just Eat PLC lost £728 million from its market
value.1 The cause of this significant drop was the decision to utilize their
soaring revenue to invest £50 million into new markets.2 Unilever PLC, a
company that generates profits of around £5 billion a year, has attempted
to leave the United Kingdom (UK) to be based solely in the Netherlands
to protect itself from future takeover bids.3 Another company bought GKN
1 Aliya Ram, Just Eat shares slide after setting out £50m investment plan, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/4494d6c2-2119-11e8-9efc-0cd3483b8b80.
2 Id. £50 million was over 10% of the company’s value at the time. Id.
3 Jonathan Guthrie, Unilever has chosen to protect itself from British capitalism,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/d6807a36-284a-11e8-b27ecc62a39d57a0; Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Unilever chief admits Kraft Heinz bid forced
compromises, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/ea0218ce-1be0-11e8aaca-4574d7dabfb6.
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PLC, an engineering company with 259 years of history.4 This buyer has
the intention of selling GKN in three to five years for a profit.5 These three
events are united by one thing: a crisis within the UK economy and its
ability to think “long-term” when shareholder value consistently drives
short-term considerations. This in turn has been linked to the UK
productivity problem,6 or productivity puzzle,7 which the most recent
research shows is linked to a slowdown in productivity growth from the
largest and most productive firms.8 The Bank of England has suggested
that decreased UK productivity growth is most likely due to a lack of
investment.9 This is not just a lack of investment in research and
development, although the UK lags behind its competitors in that area as
well,10 but also in implementing the results of the research and
development and thus causing a loss of productivity growth.11 This issue
has gone beyond a concern of the financial press and is now a political
concern, with statements on investing in the long term, encouraging
innovation, and spurring productivity—all of which are found in both of
the UK’s largest political parties’ manifestos12 and political speeches.13
4 Peggy Hollinger, Michael Pooler & Jim Pickard, Melrose victorious in hostile bid for
GKN, FINANCIAL TIMES, (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/
c6afe24c-3356-11e8-b5bf-23cb17fd1498.
5 Id.
6 International comparisons of UK productivity (ICP), final estimate: 2015, OFF. OF NAT’L
STAT. (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/
economicoutputandproductivity/productivitymeasures/bulletins/internationalcomparisons
ofproductivityfinalestimates/2015.
7 Edward Curwen, UK productivity back at pre-crisis level, BBC (Oct. 6, 2016),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-37574985; Jasper Jolly, Productivity puzzle remains or
economists despite UK growth in third quarter of 2016, CITY A.M. (Jan. 6, 2016),
http://www.cityam.com/256509/productivity-puzzle-remains-economists-despite-uk-growth;
The
Guardian view on productivity: Britain must solve the puzzle, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 9, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2017/apr/09/the-guardian-view-on-productivity-britain-must-solve-the-puzzle.
8 Patrick Schneider, The UK’s productivity puzzle is in the top tail of the distribution, BANK
UNDERGROUND (Mar. 29, 2018), https://bankunderground.co.uk/2018/03/29/
the-uks-productivity-puzzle-is-in-the-top-tail-of-the-distribution/.
9 Id.
10 JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG TERM
DECISION
MAKING:
FINAL
REPORT 14–16 (July 2012),
http://www.ecgi.org/conferences/eu_actionplan2013/documents/kay_review_final_report.pdf.
11 Alina Barnett et al., The UK productivity puzzle 122–123, BANK OF ENG. (2014),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0154/fb17c0aa098eefd70990caf7cf0783910ced.pdf.
12 For the Many Not the Few 17, THE LABOUR PARTY (2017), https://labour.org.uk/
wp-content/uploads/2017/10/labour-manifesto-2017.pdf (“When shareholders are looking
for quick short-term returns, they encourage companies to cut corners
. . . instead of investing for the long term . . . .”); “[The government] must address the UK’s
slow productivity growth . . . .” Prime Minister Theresa May, The Conservative and Unionist Party,
Forward, Together: Our Plan for a Stronger Britain and a Prosperous Future 20 (2017) (“[The
government] must address the UK’s slow productivity growth . . . .”); Id. at 19 (“We will work hard
to ensure we have a regulatory environment that encourages innovation.”).
13 See Prime Minister Theresa May, Speech in Birmingham: We can make Britain a country
that works for everyone (July 11, 2016) (“If we are going to have an economy that works for everyone
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Therefore, regardless which side of the political spectrum power rests, the
issues of investment, productivity, and takeovers14 are paramount. These
issues could be linked to capital markets transferring short-termist
mentalities into the boardroom of UK companies through the market for
corporate control and the UK’s takeover regulation.15 In short, the
Takeover Code that regulates the UK market for corporate control does
not allow any behaviour by a target company’s board that would prevent
its shareholders from deciding on the merits of a possible takeover bid.16
In light of this, scholars have argued that unlike jurisdictions that do allow
takeover defences or are not susceptible to takeovers to the same extent,
UK companies are preoccupied with producing short-term returns over
and above long-term profit generation.17 This may be a fundamental
element contributing to a dearth of investment, and consequently labour
productivity that has hardly grown for nearly ten years.18
The purpose of this paper is to argue how reforming the UK
takeover and merger rules can lead to greater long-term investment by UK
firms, while causing commensurate growth in productivity without
hindering overseas investment or entrenching inefficient management.
In order to analyze this problem, this paper will be broken into the
following elements. The first part will set out the theoretical basis for the
corporate control market transferring a short-termist mindset to UK
boardrooms, which will be contrasted with the United States of America
(US), French, Austrian, and German positions. These jurisdictions have
been selected because each represents a developed economy with an
alternative approach to UK merger regulation. The second part will
analyze the suggestion that the UK Takeover Code address these issues.
The final part will offer a new solution incorporating insights gained from
behavioural economics: reform the regulation of takeovers to account for
the predicable irrationalities in the human decision-making process. In so
. . . that means . . . doing something radical [about takeovers].”) (transcript available at
http://press.conservatives.com/
post/147947450370/we-can-make-britain-a-country-that-works-for).
14 See Forward, Together: Our Plan for a Stronger Britain and a Prosperous Future, supra
note 12, at 17 (“We welcome overseas investment and want investors to succeed here but not when
success is driven by aggressive asset-stripping or tax avoidance. We will update the rules that govern
mergers and takeovers. This will require careful deliberation . . . .”).
15 François Derrien, Ambrus Kecskés & David Thesmar, Investor Horizons and Corporate
Polices, 48 J. OF FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1755 (2013); see also Jonathan Guthrie,
Unilever Has Chosen to Protect Itself from British Capitalism, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 16, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/d6807a36-284a-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0; Michael Skapinker, The
Shareholder-First Corporate Model Erodes Public Support, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/fd702c36-206b-11e8-9efc-0cd3483b8b80.
16 See id.
17 Id.
18 See Gaganan Awano et. al., UK Productivity Introduction: April to June 2017, OFF. FOR
NAT’L STAT. (Oct. 6, 2017),
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/labourproductivity/articles/ukpr
oductivityintroduction/aprtojune2017 (noting that in 2016, output per hour had returned to its predownturn level and had slightly exceeded it for the first time since 2008).
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doing, this reform will allow companies to invest on a long-term basis
without fearing being taken over as a consequence—a solution based on
reforming the non-frustration rule, so that companies may request
authorization from their shareholders to deploy defensive measures for a
particular time period, such as five years. This paper will argue that this
reform would not only maintain the shareholder primacy that is so
fundamental to British19 corporate control culture, but also assist company
directors in planning ahead and investing securely in the knowledge that
they will not be replaced merely because they prioritize delivering long
term results.
I.

THE THEORETICAL PROBLEM WITH THE MARKET FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL

To begin, it is necessary to consider the theory of how markets
function, particularly for shares and corporate control markets. The
seminal principle explaining this market’s behaviour derives from the
efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), which explains that an efficient
market reflects all the information available in share prices.20 Further,
beyond a theoretical stance, this is a proposed model for how financial
markets in the real world actually function.
The assumptions required for this theory to work are that investors
are rational and rationally value securities, meaning they should value a
firm’s shares based on the present value of its future cash flow once the
investors factor in any associated risks. When new information becomes
available—for example, an increase or decrease in the future cash flow—
it disseminates through the market and the price of the shares adjust
accordingly.21 Where investors are not rational, their behaviour is assumed
as irrational in a random manner causing their irrationality to balance out;
for example, if fifty investors over value and stock and fifty under value,
a roughly equal dispersal of shares should cancel this out.22 Also, rational
investors cancel out irrational investors’ actions23 because if a particular
share’s price irrationally increases, then the rational shareholders will
realize this share is overpriced and that they can profit from the situation,
19 See infra Part I.A. In this instance, British will be used as a term to include the whole of
the UK, not just the British Isles.
20 Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25
J. OF FIN. 383 (1970).
21 See id. at 37.
22 Id.
23 MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECON. 159 (U. of Chi. Press, 1953); Eugene F.
Fama, The Behavior of Stock Market Prices, 38 J. OF BUS. 34 (1965).
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so they will sell this share and buy a similar, but appropriately valued one.
Rational investors selling shares will then cause the share price to return
to normal, at which point the selling will stop.24 The theory is further based
upon the foundational assumptions of neo-classical economics: that the
world is largely populated by homo economicus—an economically
rational man who maximises his utility, has unlimited information
processing power, and holds preferences that are stable.25 This will be
discussed in further detail below.
The consequence of this theory in relation to takeover regulation
is that shareholders in a particular firm will only accept an offer for a
takeover if the price paid is superior to what the company is worth (taking
into account future cash flow and risk). Likewise, a takeover offer will
only be higher than the current value of the company if the takeover will
make the combined entity more profitable—through cost savings and
economies of scale, for example. These two points combined mean that if
the EMH is accurate, a takeover offer will only be made and accepted if
the proposed takeover is efficient. That is to say that the takeover will
create value that will not exist if the firms remain separate. It follows from
the above theory that shareholders should be the arbiters of whether or not
the company in which they hold shares should be taken over. If the
takeover will generate value, the price will represent this. If the takeover
will not generate value, the offer price will also reflect this and there will
be no reason to sell the shares on. Interference with this right to accept or
reject a takeover will, according to the EMH, result in inefficient results
where companies are not sold when they will create value or are sold when
they will not.26 Within this context, the next step is to consider the current
UK regulatory framework for takeovers.
A. The UK Takeover Code
In the UK, the market for corporate control is regulated by the
Takeover Panel and the body of rules it maintains, namely, the Takeover
Code.27 One of the most interesting aspects of the Takeover Code is that it
almost completely prohibits a company that is the target of a takeover from
engaging in any sort of behaviour that will prevent that takeover.28 The
part of the Takeover Code that is of relevance here is the non-frustration
rule. The code states:

Id.
See JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOUR (16th ed. 1953); ROBERT FRANK & EDWARD CARTWRIGHT, MICROECONOMICS AND
BEHAVIOUR 56 (2013); HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 3 (9th ed. 2014).
26 See Fama, supra note 20.
27
The
Panel
on
Takeovers
and
Mergers,
The
Takeover
Code,
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf?v=8Jan2018.
28 Unless given a mandate to do so by its shareholders.
24
25
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During the course of an offer, or even before the date of the
offer if the board of the offeree company has reason to believe
that a bona fide offer might be imminent, the board must not,
without the approval of the shareholders in general meeting: (a)
take any action which may result in any offer or bona fide
possible offer being frustrated or in shareholders being denied
the opportunity to decide on its merits . . .. 29

What this means in practice is that the board of a target company
is not able to take any action that would prevent the shareholders of the
target company from deciding to accept the potential offer. This is a
remarkable rule and one that places the UK market for corporate control
in an unusual position. This position is one of almost unrivalled exposure
to takeovers from non-UK companies, including hostile takeovers.30 This
is partly due to the rule and partly due to the make-up of shareholders in
UK companies—best understood through a brief comparison with other
jurisdictions.
B. Comparison with Other Jurisdictions’ Rules.
In the US, there is no law corresponding to the non-frustration
rule. Instead, it is common for US companies to deploy “poison pill”
defences.31 In these, if a bidder who has not been approved by the board
crosses a particular threshold of voting shares, all shareholders, excluding
the unapproved bidder, are given the right to purchase new shares at a
significant discount to the trading price.32 This dilutes the shareholding of
the potential new owner and prevents them from obtaining control.33 As a
consequence, companies in the US are placed in a position where they
have significant control over potential takeovers, and therefore, if
investing large amount of capital into long term projects, they may be less
likely to feel exposed to a takeover threat. This is not to say there is no
short-term pressure on public companies,34 but that there is still a greater
level of control over it than in the UK jurisdiction.
29
The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The Takeover Code, D2,
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf?v=8Jan2018.
30 See infra section I.B.
31 Suzanne S. Dawson et al., Poison Pill Defensive Measures, 42 THE BUS. LAWYER 423
(1987).
32 See id.
33 Id.
34 Concern for corporate short-termism has also been brought to the fore in the US, not
least through the concerns of US President Trump. See, e.g. Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson & Mamta
Badkar, Trump asks SEC to Study Scrapping Quarterly Earnings Reports, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug.
17, 2018); John Authers, Trump is Right to Push Debate on Quarterly Reporting, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Aug. 17, 2018). These concerns are also evident in the attempts of Elon Musk to take Tesla Inc.
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Another example of how companies in other jurisdictions are
likely to be less concerned about takeover threats can be seen in France.
State intervention in mergers and acquisitions in France are
commonplace.35 This is in contrast to the UK where intervention is rare.36
Whether formally or informally, France has repeatedly intervened and
disapproved of numerous control transactions when the target is seen to be
of “strategic” importance.37 But this term has been interpreted very
broadly indeed, covering varying sectors, from more obvious candidates
of strategic importance such as energy to more surprising sectors, such as
the business of producing yogurt.38 This means that once again, the
situation of a leading firm in France is very different from the situation
present in the UK, as there is a far greater possibility of a takeover being
blocked by the government should a takeover attempt occur.39
In Austria, there is also a non-frustration rule;40 however, the
shareholder make-up in Austria is significantly different to that of the UK.
In Austria, the major companies tend to have a significant controlling
shareholder which renders takeovers impossible without their consent.41
Contrast this with the UK where major companies tend to be held by a
vastly diversified shareholder group.42 UK firms tend to have low singledigit percentile shareholders.43 This means that unlike in Austria, it is very
easy for a potential bidder to purchase shares and build up a controlling
interest, thus making hostile takeovers possible.
Germany has had, until recently, a relatively open market toward
foreign takeovers, but now this is becoming slightly more restricted.44 The
private to allow the company to make decisions that are right “for the long term.” Elon Musk, Taking
Tesla Private, https://www.tesla.com/en_GB/blog/taking-tesla-private? (last visited Sep. 5, 2018); see
also Arash Massoudi, Richard Waters & James Fontanella-Khan, Elon Musk Declares Plan to Take
Tesla Private, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 7, 2018); Shannon Bond & James Fontanella-Khan, Electric
Carmaker Founder Drops Buyout Plan, Saying His Investors Told Him: “Don’t do this”, FINANCIAL
TIMES, (Aug. 25, 2018).
35 Andreas Heinemann, Government Control of Cross-Border M&A: Legitimate
Regulation or Protectionism?, 15(3) J. INT’L ECON. L. 843.
36 S. Dinc & I. Erel, Economic Nationalism in Mergers and Acquisitions, 68(6) J. OF FIN.
2471, 2480 (2013).
37 Heinemann, supra note 35, at 848–849.
38
See Deborah Orr, Danone: Not for Sale, FORBES (June 25, 2005),
https://www.forbes.com/2005/07/25/danone-pepsi-takeover-cz_do_
0725danone.html (where it is stated that French legislators considered the idea of Danone
being purchased by Pepsi Co “scandalous”).
39 Heinemann, supra note 35.
40 See the Austrian Takeover Act at https://unternehmensrecht.univie.ac.at/
fileadmin/user_upload/i_unternehmensrecht/Lehre/WS_201516/Kurse/Stockenhuber/030681_MuA_I/Austrian_Takeover_Act_englisch.pdf.
41 KERSHAW, infra note 59 at 356.
42
Ownership of UK Quoted Shares, OFF. NAT’L STAT. (2014),
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/bulletins/ownershipofukquotedshar
es/2015-09-02.
43
B. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH BUSINESS
TRANSFORMED (2008).
44 See Guy Chazan, Germany expands powers to block takeovers, FINANCIAL TIMES (July
12, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/5087c106-66fc-11e7-9a66-93fb352ba1fe; Melanie Hall,
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German government has recently passed a directive increasing their ability
to block non-EU companies from acquiring more than 25% of a company
where the takeover could endanger “critical infrastructure.”45 The original
state of the law only allowed for takeovers to be prevented if they were a
threat to national security or public order.46 The new language can cover a
far broader array of companies, for example if they write software for
power plants, energy and water supply networks, electronic payments,
hospitals and transport systems in addition to defence and surveillance
companies.47 It also extends the amount of time the government has to
investigate takeovers.48 This change of heart is largely prompted by two
takeover attempts. This first was the successful takeover of Augsburg
robot manufacturer KUKA by the Chinese company Midea.49 This went
ahead despite the resistance of the then Finance Minister, Sigmar
Gabriel.50 The second takeover over was of computer chip equipment
manufacturer AIXTRON, which failed due to US security concerns since
AIXTRON also supplies the arms industry.51 It is notable that, while
ostensibly this move was wholly about protecting the wider infrastructure
that supports national security, Economics Minister Brigitte Zypries said
at the time that she paid attention to “fair competition” and that German
companies often competed with countries whose economic systems were
not as open as theirs.52 So once again, even in an economy as free and open
as Germany’s, it appears that there is an increasing scope for firms to be
protected from unwanted takeovers.
In summary, UK companies are more open to non-UK hostile
takeovers than comparable national firms in other jurisdictions. UK firms
tend to have a large number of shareholders rather than a single controlling
shareholder.53 At least since 2012, UK firms possess a majority of

Germany moves to block takeovers by foreign investors, THE TELEGRAPH (July 12, 2017),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/07/12/germany-moves-block-takeovers-foreigninvestors/.
45 Verordnung, Neunte Verordnung zur Änderung der Außenwirtschaftsverordnung,
Bundesregierung. Section 55.
46 See e.g. Chazan, supra note 44.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Edward Taylor, China’s Midea receives U.S. green light for Kuka takeover, REUTERS
(Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kuka-m-a-mideamidea-group/chinas-mideareceives-u-s-green-light-for-kuka-takeover-idUSKBN14J0SP.
50 Amie Tsang, Midea of China Moves a Step Closer to Takeover of Kuka of Germany,
N.Y. TIMES (July, 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/05/business/
dealbook/germany-china-midea-kuka-technology-robotics.html.
51 Regierung will Übernahmen strenger prüfen, SÜEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (July 12, 2017),
https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/
2017/20170712-zypries-besserer-schutz-bei-firmenuebernahmen.html.
52 Id.
53 Cheffins, supra note 43, at 1.
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shareholders who are not UK citizens,54 meaning control is not just decentralised in terms of number, but also in geography. Further, due to the
non-frustration rule, (as well as other corporate laws) there is nothing a
UK firm can do to prevent a hostile takeover.55 This situation gave rise to
the criticism that due to the relatively high chance of being subject to the
interest of a bidder, combined with the inability to prevent hostile bids,
UK boards are overly concerned with protecting their position through the
only real means possible: producing results from one period to the next. If
this is the case then it may be a contributing factor that influences the UK’s
lower R&D spend56 and lower productivity.57 But is this actually a
reasonable argument? If a company invests large amounts into R&D, will
this not be taken into account by traders when evaluating the value of the
company? If a company invests millions of pounds into a long-term
project, assuming that project at some point yields fruit, capital will be
returned to investors and that should be priced in.58
However, Kershaw insightfully argued that there are a several
reasons why markets may not correctly evaluate the value of long term
projects.59 These are as follows: (a) managers cannot disclose great
amounts of detail about projects if it would devalue the project; (b) the
longer term the investment and the type of research may mean that there
is a higher level of uncertainty associated with long term investments over
and above short term cash, this may decrease the share price in the short
term and cause concern for fund managers focused on the short term; (c)
shareholders may have difficulty trusting the assessment of boards when
considering a project’s profitability.60 This is because, should a manager
be taken to court for misleading disclosures regarding a project, they will
likely be given greater scope if their projections do not come true as the
project stretches further into the future. If this is the case, managers may
feel they can exaggerate the future success of a project and consequently,
shareholders may not feel they can trust such predictions in the same way
that they can trust a prediction that comes to fruition in two years.61
Consequently, there may be good reasons why investors are unable to
accurately assess the value of long term investments, and therefore, may
tend to favour short-term returns instead.
See Ownership of UK Quoted Shares, supra note 42.
KERSHAW, infra note 59 at 334–337.
See Kay, supra note 10 (establishing low levels on investment and R&D by UK
corporations and low levels compared to other developed economies).
57 International comparisons of UK productivity (ICP), final estimate: 2015, OFF. FOR
NAT’L STAT., https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/
productivitymeasures/bulletins/internationalcomparisonsofproductivityfinalestimates/201
5 (last visited June 23, 2017).
58 Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism – In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 97
BUS. LAWYER 977 (March 15, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2239132.
59 DAVID KERSHAW, PRINCIPLES OF TAKEOVER REGULATION 28 (2016).
60 Id.
61 Id.
54
55
56
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There is also a potential issue linked to the increase in fund
management.62 Fund managers are given funds by investors through the
comparison of their recent performance with other fund managers.63 An
investor considering which fund to deposit their capital in is likely to
consider the fund manager who has obtained a 35% return in the last two
quarters as superior to one who has obtained only 10% in the same period.
It stands to reason then that the fund managers with the highest relative
return will receive the most money to manage and consequently earn the
most commission/fees. This may drive fund managers to prioritise short
term profit, which in particular will encourage aiming to have the highest
performance at the next bench-marking date. After all, there may be little
benefit in achieving a 50% return in ten years if there are significant netoutflows of capital in the nine years prior. This may drive short-term
focused behaviour amongst fund managers, and this may result in short
term focused behaviour in the market for corporate control.64
This is supported by recent evidence that suggests that relative
performance evaluation drives herding behaviour amongst investor
portfolios. Herding behaviour is possible because institutional investors
know more about their peers’ trades than retail investors.65 Evaluation
based on fund managers’ performance relative to their peers has been
argued to produce an obvious incentive to herd.66 Given that institutional
62 See generally FUNDS UNDER MANAGEMENT, THE INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION,
https://www.theinvestmentassociation.org/fund-statistics/funds-undermanagement.html?what=graph&show=4.
63 See Kay, supra note 10.
64 Consider the following by way of illustration: Two fund managers both invest £500,000
in “Company A.” Company A becomes subject of a potential takeover bid for 200p. This undervalues
Company A’s long-term value by 15%. During the takeover period the share price moves from 150p
to 190p. This would not be unusual, as often the price moves towards the offer price subject to a
discount that signifies the chance of the deal falling through. Fund manager one sells his shares at
190p. Fund manager two now suffers a difficult choice. If he sells his shares either during the bid of
before he will gain a profit but will lose out in the long term due to the undervalued purchase price.
However, if he doesn’t sell his shares and the deal falls through then the share price will likely drop
down to the pre-bid level, approximately 150p. Should this happen at the next point where fund
manager one and two are benchmarked against each other, fund manager one will have benefited from
significant gains in the share price (despite selling below value) whereas fund manager two will have
gained nothing from the failed bid at all despite valuing the price of the shares correctly. This would
no doubt look unfavourable in terms of comparative benchmarking and potentially lose business for
fund manager two, despite his accurate long-term assessment of value. See KERSHAW, supra note 59,
at 344.
65 See Abhijit Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J . ECON. 797 (1992);
Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and
Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992, 992 (1992).
66 Andrei Shleifer, A Theory of Yardstick Competition, 16 RAND J. ECON. 319 (1985);
David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 465
(1990). However, also consider how the flow of information between fund managers within their
social network leads to investment patterns, which in themselves become self-reinforcing. Les
Coleman, Facing Up to Fund Managers: An Exploratory Field Study of how Institutional Investors
make Decisions, 7 QUALITATIVE RES. FIN. MKTS. 111, 121 (2015); Johan Henningsson, Fund
Managers as Cultured Observers, QUALITATIVE RES. FIN. MKTS. 27 (2009).
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investors are of such a size that their investment decisions can in fact
influence the market,67 this is highly significant. There is now sufficient
empirical evidence to suggest that such herding occurs in mutual funds,68
hedge funds,69 and pension funds.70 Additionally, there is evidence to
suggest that fund managers are well aware that even good long term
decisions can result in the loss of clients when they produce poor short
term results.71 One empirical study of fund managers’ behaviour goes so
far as to state that “[v]irtually all managers saw the sell decision as harder
than choosing which stocks to buy, and also see this as an area where they
are prone to behavioural biases.”72 This is all the more significant when
considering the bid price of takeovers, where instead of evaluating longterm value, shareholders appear to consider bids through anchored
expectations based upon historical prices.73
II.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE SHORT-TERMISM PROBLEM

There are a number of potential solutions to the short-termism
problem. The government could intervene to a greater extent to protect
companies where it believes that it is in the nation’s economic interest,
short-term shareholders could be disenfranchised of their votes, or the
acceptance threshold for a merger could be increased. The respective
merits of these possibilities will now be considered.

67 See Louis K. C. Chan & Josef Lakonishok, The Behavior of Stock Prices Around
Institutional Trades, 50 J. FIN. 1147 (1995); Patrick J. Dennis, Deon Strickland, Who Blinks in Volatile
Markets, Individuals or Institutions?, 57 J. FIN. 1923 (2002).
68 Mark Grinblatt, Sheridan Titman & Russ Wermers, Momentum Investment Strategies,
Portfolio Performance, and Herding: A Study of Mutual Fund Behavior, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1088
(1995); Russ Wermers, Mutual Fund Trading and the Impact on Stock Prices, 54 J. FIN. 581 (1999);
Joshua Coval & Erik Stafford, Asset Fire Sales (and Purchases) in Equity Markets, 86 J. FIN. ECON.
479 (2007).
69 Richard Sias, H. J. Turtle & Blerina Zykaj, Hedge Fund Crowds and Mispricing, 62
MGMT. SCI. 764 (2015).
70 David Blake, Lucio Sarno & Gabriele Zinna, The Market for Lemmings: The Investment
Behavior of Pension Funds, 36 J. FIN. MKT. 17 (2017); Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer & Robert
Vishny, The Impact of Institutional Trading on Stock Prices, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 23 (1992).
71 Richard J. Taffler, Crawford Spence & Arman Eshraghi, Emotional Economic Man:
Calculation and Anxiety in Fund Managers, 61 ACCT. ORG. SOC’Y 53 (2017). An interview with one
fund manager yielded the following response: “short-term numbers . . . you know that's noise. People
aren’t stupid but even though they know that, commercially it’s sometimes very difficult to behave in
a way that’s rational. In a long-term sense what’s rational in terms of investment behaviour may not
be rational commercially. That’s the problem.” And further, discussing when a manager takes an
appropriate long term view but the short term results do not impress your client “even if you were
completely convinced you were right, even if you don't panic, your employer might panic or your
clients might panic in which case, to be honest, bad luck.” Id.
72 Les Coleman, Facing Up To Fund Managers: An exploratory field study of how
institutional investors make decisions, 7 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH IN FIN. MKTS., 111, 127 (2015).
73 Malcolm Baker, Xin Pan & Jeffrey Wurgler, The Effect of Reference Point Prices on
Mergers and Acquisitions, 106 J. FIN. ECON. 49 (2012); Chip Heath, Steven Huddart & Mark Lang,
Psychological Factors and Stock Option Exercise, 114 Q. J. OF ECON. 601 (1999).
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A. Government Intervention
The first possibility is also the easiest to reject. If investors cannot
accurately evaluate the value of an investment, it is difficult to see why a
government would be any better. Even if it is assumed that a firm is
undervalued due to a long-term investment that is not being valued
properly, it is difficult to see how this would be established objectively.
There would also be the potential for generating moral hazard.74 If a
government selects a particular company to be considered of such
economic import to the nation to prevent it being taken over, this may
signal to the board of that company that they are “too big to fail” or at least
“too important to fail.”75 This could result in the company becoming more
wasteful, increasing agency costs, taking unnecessary risks, or other
behaviour that reduces competitiveness.76 This is due to the belief that
should things go wrong, the government will intervene because of their
economic importance.77
In the alternative, if the government did not focus on value to
shareholders, but rather intervened when there was a general economic
interest at stake or when a “strategic” industry was at risk, there would
then be the risk that “strategic” would take on a particularly flexible
meaning as it does presently in France.78 In addition, as signified by the
takeover of Cadbury’s79 by Kraft in 2010, the amount of pressure a
government can be under to intervene in a merger may not be
proportionate to the company’s strategic value to the country in which it
is headquartered. As a consequence, direct government intervention would
be liable to result in haphazard intervention on more political than
economic motivations.
B. Disenfranchising Shareholders
An idea put forward by Sir Roger Carr, the previous chairman of
Cadbury Plc, was that certain shareholders could have their votes removed

74 Ning Gong & Kenneth Jones, Bailouts, Monitoring, and Penalties: An Integrated
Framework of Government Policies to Manage the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 13 INTL. REV. FIN. 299
(2013).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 An extremely popular confectionary company based in the UK.
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when it came to hostile takeovers.80 This proposal first requires an
explanation of the current problem as seen by Sir Roger Carr. When
Cadbury was subject to a bid by the US firm Kraft Foods, Cadbury initially
resisted the bid considering it to be undervalued. Resisting the takeover
was very difficult, however, because Carr found that once a potential bid
was announced, merger arbitrageurs would buy into the company for the
single purpose of completing the deal, and then making a profit when the
deal goes through; the profit being the difference between the market price
of the shares bought and the offer price for the shares in the takeover.81
There is usually a gap between the two values which represents the risk
that the deal will not be completed. The difficulty with this is that once a
certain number of shares are acquired for this purpose, it becomes all but
impossible for the board to resist a bid. This is because the merger
arbitrageurs are not interested in holding a long position in the company,
their plan to make a quick profit is dependent upon the deal being
completed. This means the board of the target will have very unreceptive
ears when trying to convince the shareholders to refuse the offer. If these
new shareholders are disenfranchised, then the decision would rest with
the shareholders with a long position, and as such those who are likely to
have the long-term interests of the company at heart.
Kershaw has argued however that such an idea misses the
problem.82 He argues that if merger arbitrageurs have ownership of shares
this is because the original shareholders who did have long positions felt
that it was worth selling their shares. If this was because the offer price
represented good value this is not an issue, but if, as described above, this
is a result of short-termism by fund managers seeking to enhance their
relative performance then the underlying problem will still exist.83 This is
because there is a risk that even if shares are disenfranchised, if merger
arbitrageurs still buy the shares (despite knowing that they cannot vote on
the offer) this will push the share price up. If this happens then fund
managers will still feel they have to sell in order to ensure they benefit
from the increase in price brought about by the bid. It is only if the
disenfranchisement of shares bought during the bid discourages investors
from buying shares that this change would have any effect. This is because
if investors do not buy the shares the price will not rise up to near the offer
level and so there will be no incentive for fund managers to sell if the bid
is undervalued. This result may be unlikely if merger arbitrageurs and

80 Amy Wilson, UK takeover threshold should be raised, says chairman Roger Carr, THE
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/
retailandconsumer/7198336/UK-takeover-threshold-should-be-raised-says-ex-Cadburychairman-Roger-Carr.htm.
81 KERSHAW, supra note 59 at 356.
82 KERSHAW, supra note 59 at 362.
83 Id.
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investors are generally aware of the incentive to sell that will be created if
they buy shares from fund managers and push up the price.84
C. Increasing the Acceptance Threshold for Takeover Acceptance
Another suggestion to resolve the issue, put forward by Carr, is to
increase the threshold for takeover acceptance.85 Once again, this idea is
premised on the problem that once an offer is made, shares are sold into
the market by long-term shareholders and bought by merger arbitrageurs
that hope to profit from the difference between their purchase price and
that of the offer. Carr considered that if the threshold was increased to
above 50% then this would reduce the risk of new shareholders being
decisive in overriding the wishes of the long-term shareholders.86 In
theory, if the threshold is high enough and the number of shareholders who
have a long-term view great enough, then their votes will be determinative
of whether or not the deal goes through, rather than the votes of the merger
arbitrageurs being determinative. This suggestion has been commended,87
it has been argued that such a policy would not only be consistent with the
non-frustration rule88 but further that it would make the theory upon which
the rule was founded a reality, which is that shareholders make their
decisions based upon the long-term value of the shares and consequently,
the company.89 This is because it empowers those shareholders who
actually work on this basis and effectively neuters, or at least weakens, the
influence of those who do not.
Whilst providing a useful insight into the matter, this proposal
may be missing the underlying issue. The proposal looks to which
shareholders are making the decision rather than considering when they
are making the decision. In essence, it assumes that there is a large body
of shareholders who are incentivised to sell their shares because of relative
performance bench marks whose shares are bought by those only
interested in a quick profit through the deal going ahead while
simultaneously there is a core of long-term shareholders who are
genuinely interested in the company’s long-term welfare and are not
swayed by short-term incentives. In reality, it may be that all shareholders,
whether retail investors or fund managers, are in a position where they are
Id.
Wilson, supra note 80.
86 Id.
87 KERSHAW, supra note 59 at 358.
88
The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers,
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/
11/code.pdf?v=8Jan2018.
89 KERSHAW, supra note 59 at 358.
84
85
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required to wrestle with the conflict between of short-term and long-term
perspectives. It is at this point it becomes very helpful to consider the
issues through the lens of behavioural economics.
III.

A NEW SOLUTION

A. Viewing the problem through behavioural economics
Historically, economic theory has been founded upon the model
of “rational choice” economics.90 This model is based on some wellestablished assumptions. Rational choice theory assumes that customers
enter the market with well-defined preferences and then considering the
prices as given, they allocate their resources in order to best satisfy their
preferences.91 This core principle is often phrased in the following way:
when market actors such as buyers and sellers are optimising, they will
choose to use their capital to acquire the best products and services in the
best combination that suits them.92 Companies or firms are also considered
to be rational and optimizing, but rather than seeking to satiate particular
wants or needs, they are assumed to make their decisions in order to
maximise profits.93 When these two actors interact on a competitive
market where prices are free, prices are altered in a way such a way that
supply equals demand. This is to say that markets naturally reach an
equilibrium.94 They will do this in a logical and rational fashion, thus
providing the basis for “rational choice” theory.
The difficulty with rational choice theory is that recently, the idea
that humans are rational in their choices has been significantly
undermined. That is not to say that humans are unpredictable, mad, or have
no interest in optimizing the use of their resources. Rather, what this means
is that humans tend to make predictable behavioural choices that are
consistent, but logically flawed from the point of view of the rational
choice model of economics. This is for a number of reasons. One of these
reasons was identified very early on by Herbert A. Simon.95 Simon noted
that rather than pursuing an optimal outcome, humans—as a result of the
increasingly complex decisions and the inability to calculate every
possible outcome—would depend on heuristics or trial-and-error to find a
HERBERT HUGO LIRBHAFSKY, THE NATURE OF PRICE THEORY 26 (1965).
ROBERT FRANK & EDWARD CARTWRIGHT, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOUR 57–58
(2013); JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR (1953).
92 HAL R. VERIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 3 (9th ed. 2014).
93 Id. at 363.
94 Id. at 292.
95 See C. B.MCGUIRE & ROY RADNER, DECISION AND ORGANIZATION (2d ed. 1972).
90
91
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satisfactory outcome.96 Decisions then were made within a “bounded
rationality.”97 This was further supported by Tversky and Kahneman, two
key figures considering behaviour in the field of psychology. They found
humans made consistent, predictable errors of judgement due to their
reliance on certain heuristics and their underlying biases.98 These
heuristics and biases meant that humans are not only not optimising in
certain situations, but rather they make predicable mistakes of judgment.99
A particularly important finding of Kahneman and Tversky was
that humans dislike losses more than they like gains.100 For example, the
enjoyment or satisfaction of gaining £1,000 is not the same as the amount
of dissatisfaction that is felt if the same person lost £1,000. Further study
quantified the ratio, indicating that people dislike losses twice as much as
they like gains.101 A simple illustration could be as follows: a retailer
receives a new card machine that allows his customers to pay by credit
card. However, he is charged by the bank for each payment made by credit
card, so he passes the charge on to the customer. He can set a fee of £1.00
for the use of the card or he could offer a £1.00 discount for those
customers that use cash. Depending on which wording he uses, the
outcome is essentially the same. From a rational choice point of view, the
expectation would be that there would be no greater or fewer users of a
card regardless of the phraseology, either a customer considers that it is
worth £1 to use their card or they do not. As an optimiser, the way the offer
is presented is irrelevant. However in reality such situations yield different
results. Richard Thaler, professor of economics at the University of
Chicago and recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics, noticed a number
of strange behaviours exhibited by market actors which suggested that
they were not acting according the the rational choice model.102 Thaler
began looking into what biases and behaviours existed that caused market
actors to depart from rational choice theory and this developed into what
is now known as behavioural economics.103 Much of the work in
behavioural economics focuses on demonstrating which factors—ones
that would normally be considered irrelevant from a rational choice point
Id. at 164.
Id. at 162.
98 AMOS TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES 185, 1124 (1974).
99 Id.
100 DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY, CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 39, 341
(1984).
101 See Amos Taversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative
Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 297, 310 (1992) (“[A] prospect will only be
acceptable if the gain is at least twice as large as the loss.”).
102 RICHARD THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS 20–21
(2016).
103 Id. at 9.
96
97
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of view—are in fact highly relevant in predicting market actors’
behaviour.104 This helps produce models of behaviour that are a more
accurate reflection of reality. By producing more accurate models, it
becomes possible to shape law and policy in such a way as to produce
better results or from an economic perspective, more efficient results.105
Such changes have been implemented in various jurisdictions 106 and are
now commonly known as “nudges,” a term coined by Sunstein and Thaler
in their book of the same name.107 Nudges do not restrict the freedom of
an individual but rather “nudges” them toward the more efficient outcome,
a term coined as libertarian paternalism.108 This is extremely pertinent
when there is a certain conduct that is regulated and the behaviour is linked
to an inefficient outcome, such as market failure.
The application of such behavioural economics insights can
explain various anomalies that exist within finance.109 However, until now,
such insights have not been considered in relation to takeover regulation
and its effect on short-termist behaviour. In this paper, behavioural
economics is used to identify an underlying bias for which rational choice
models take no account in the market for corporate control. It is then used
to posit a major reform of the Takeover Code to reframe the regulation so
as to avoid this underlying bias and the failure that it causes.

Id. at 5–9.
See Michael Hallsworth et al, Behavioural Government: Using Behavioural Science To
Improve How Governments Make Decisions, THE BEHAV. INSIGHTS TEAM, (2018),
https://38r8om2xjhhl25mw24492dir-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/BITBehavioural-Government-Report-2018.pdf (using UK government financing to applying behavioural
insights to policy making for U.K government); EXEC. ORDER NO. 13707, 80 FED. REG. 181 (Sept.
15, 2015) (executive order under Pres. Barrack Obama directing government to utilize behavioural
sciences to help government better structure programs so that a more efficient utilization of
government programs is realized).
106 The Behavioural Insights Team in the UK, CENTRE FOR PUBLIC IMPACT (Mar. 31,
2016), https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/behavioural-insights-team-in-the-uk/.
107 See RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009).
108 Id.
109 See generally Schlomo Benartzi & Richard Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and the
Equity Premium Puzzle, 110 Q. J. ECON. 73 (1995) (using behaviourial sciences to explain why stocks
have consistently outperformed bonds over the last century, and honing in on investors 'myopic loss
aversion' as the reason for this trend); Uri Gneezy & Jan Potters, An Experiment on Risk Taking and
Evaluation Periods, 112(2) THE Q. J. ECON. 631 (1997) (using myopic loss aversion as the behavioural
hypotheses that justifies increases in investor risk aversion based upon the frequency of portfolio
evaluation); Rajnish Mehra & Edward C. Prescott, The Equity Premium: A Puzzle, 15 J. OF MONETARY
ECON. 145 (1985) (exploring the reason behind why equity returns far outstrip bond holding returns
and its relation to investor risk aversion); Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, The Disposition to Sell
Winnders Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long; Theory and Evidence, 40 J. FIN. 777 (1985) (exploring
investor behavioural impulses, such as the aversion to loss realization, to understand why investors
sell winning stocks too early or hold losing stocks too long); Richard Thaler et al, The Effect of Myopia
and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test, 112(2) THE Q. J. ECON. 647 (testing
expirimentally investor behaviour, namely myopic loss inversion to determine future investor actions).
See also MICHELLE BADDELEY, BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS AND FINANCE (2013).
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It is not necessary to discuss each and every bias that has been
identified in the behavioural economics literature here.110 For the purposes
of this paper, it is only necessary is to consider the biases that will
influence a shareholder’s decision to either accept a takeover, sell into the
market once it has been announced, or reject it in a way that is sub-optimal.
This is because if there is some bias in the decision-making process that
causes investor decisions to be sub-optimal, this can have a knock-on
effect that undermines the board’s ability to make profit maximising
decisions and will have a negative impact on the efficiency and
productivity of the economy.
The bias relevant here stems from the insight established by
Kahneman and Tversky about the way humans perceive loss and gains. As
previously stated, humans like gains only half as much as they hate losses;
they are loss averse.111 Consequently, the point in time when a shareholder
makes a decision about whether to accept or reject takeover bids will
impact the likelihood of his or her accepting. This is because, depending
on whether or not an offer has been made, shareholders are likely to frame
the potential outcomes differently; sometimes as losses and sometimes as
gains.
This phenomenon, where people value what they have more than
what they could have, even if it has the same nominal value, is called the
endowment effect.112 The endowment effect holds that people are more
loss-averse in regard to what they already have than what they could
have.113 One is an out-of-pocket expense, and the other is regarded as an
opportunity cost. Even if both the out-of-pocket expense and the
opportunity cost are of the same nominal value, they are not treated equally
by people. If an individual is given the chance to pay to avoid the risk of
losing £100, they pay a higher value than they are willing to pay to obtain
the chance to gain £100, even if the odds are the same. Mathematically,
one may expect the price to be exactly the same, but in practice they will
be valued differently because the first will be taken from one’s endowment
while the other is simply an opportunity cost.114
Now this has an impact when the information is applied to a
situation where an investor is required to decide whether or not to accept
an offer for their shares as part of a takeover bid. Consider the following
110 See David Hirshleifer, Behavioural Finance, 7 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 133 (2015)
(containing a list of biases identified by a leading figure in behavioural finance).
111 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative
representation of uncertainty, 5 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992).
112 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 193 (1991); RICHARD THALER,
MISBEHAVING 12–19 (2016).
113 Id.
114 Id.
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two scenarios by way of illustration: Person A has 500 shares in Cole Ltd.
The shares generally trade around £1.00. A takeover offer is announced
and each share increases in value to £1.25. Person A’s shares used to be
worth £500, but now due to the offer they are worth £625. Person A is
informed by Cole Ltd.’s board that they believe the offer undervalues the
company, and in five years, when a particular investment in widget
production has been completed, the shares will be worth £1.50. Person A
now has a choice to make: accept the offer or sell into the market and
realize the value of the shares instantly, or in the alternative, hold on to the
shares and trust that the investment will pay off as described by the board.
The difficulty is that if the offer is not accepted, that will almost certainly
have immediate consequences for the share price. With the takeover
rejected, the share price is highly likely to drop down to around £1.00 once
more since the takeover premium has now evaporated. Given this
situation, Person A’s decision can be described as follows:
Action
Sell
Hold

Benefit
Obtain
share value
Potential
future
profit

Likelihood
Near certain
Uncertain

Loss
Likelihood
Potential
Uncertain
future profit
Immediate
Near certain
share price
decrease

Obtaining the current value of the shares is all but certain if they
sell. The loss, however, is contingent on the market behaving according to
the prediction of Cole Ltd.’s board and so is less certain. But this is only
part of the problem. Fundamental to this decision is that the increase in
share value has already happened; Person A is in possession of £625 of
shares. If the deal is rejected, the share price will return to its original
position. Thus, if the deal is not completed, Person A will lose £125 in
equity value, a loss that will be felt all the more keenly due to the innate
dislike of loses above the like of gains. As a consequence, shareholders
are likely to sell their shares to avoid losing their investment’s
(£0.25p/share) value, rather than hold on for a (£0.25) gain, not just
because the short-term loss is more certain than the long-term gain, but
because the shareholder is more averse to losing 25p than they are inclined
towards gaining 25p.
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Graph 1
Graph 1 and Graph 2 also illustrate this point. Starting with Graph
1, if Point a is when an offer is made, Point b is when a shareholder has to
decide whether to accept an offer, Point c when a rejected bid is dropped,
and Point d the point where the board predicts the share price will be if the
company is not taken over. Then, even if the shareholder thinks the bid
undervalues the company, his risk aversion will naturally incline him
towards avoiding the drop in value of the shares (y) he already has, rather
than pursuing a possible gain (x) in future, even if they are around the same
level.
This is all further supported by research that suggests that market
actors (and humans in general) have a “present bias.”115 This means that
they are more likely to procrastinate immediate cost activities, such as
paying more money into a pension scheme, and are more likely to
preproperate activities that provide immediate benefits.116 Further an
awareness of one’s propensity to make such flawed decisions can help
reduce procrastination, but actually only intensifies preproperation.117
Applying this to our current situation, this only serves to reinforce the
point. If an investor holds shares in a company that is subject to a takeover
announcement, when he is considering whether to accept an offer he will
be subject to present bias. He can have an immediate payoff through the
selling of his shares which will give him a bid premium, or he can hold his
shares and benefit from a greater payoff when the company’s investments
come to fruition. In this calculation, he will value the immediate payoff
with a positive bias when comparing it to a payoff later after holding the
shares for an extended period of time.

115 Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103
(1999). See also Warren K. Bickel, Amy L. Odum & Gregory J. Madden, Impulsivity and cigarette
smoking: delay discounting in current, never, and ex-smokers, 146 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 447
(1999); Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time
Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351 (2002); David Laibson, Golden Eggs
and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. ECON. 443 (1997).
116 To the author’s understanding, prior to thorough economic investigation this was called
impatience.
117 Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103
(1999) 104–05, 109–12.
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B. The solution
The solution to this problem is to change the timing of the
decision. This can be done by altering the Takeover Code to allow
takeover defences to be approved by shareholders for a defined period of
time in advance of takeover offers. Currently the rules state that:
if the board of the offeree company has reason to believe that a
bona fide offer might be imminent, the board must not, without
the approval of the shareholders in general meeting:
(a) take any action which may result in any offer or bona fide
possible offer being frustrated or in shareholders being denied
the opportunity to decide on its merits118

This rule means that defending a takeover is in fact allowed by the
Takeover Code, but only with the approval of the shareholders to defend
the company from that particular takeover in a general meeting. This
hinders the practical ability to implement takeover defences, unless a
majority of shareholders would vote to allow their company to frustrate a
takeover. It is likely that those same shareholders would vote against the
takeover offer itself, so if such approval was possible, it would also be
unnecessary.119 This situation can be changed if an additional clause is
added to Rule 21.1:
. . . unless the approval of the shareholders has been given for
the board to take such action prior to an offer becoming
imminent. Such approval must stipulate the following
conditions:
a) The duration of the permission to take such action (up
to a renewable maximum of 10 years)
b) The programme of investment for which the approval
is requested
c) The conditions upon which the approval becomes
ineffective. In particular regarding an absolute or
percentage change in share price or dividend or a
deviation of such from a nominated sectoral
benchmark

118 The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The Takeover Code, PRACTICE STATEMENT
NO 32, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf?v=8Jan2018.
119 There is the theoretical possibility of takeover defences being approved prior to any
imminent offer, which would be legitimate, but in reality such a defence is still likely to fall afoul of
the rule because it would require some sort of action or inaction on behalf of the board to distinguish
between takeovers the board considers desirable and those that are undesirable, for example, board
dis/approval of the bid. This action would be considered frustrating action on behalf of the board
rendering it once again a breach of the Code.
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The effect of such a change would be substantial. It would make
it possible for a board that has no imminent offers apparent to seek
approval from shareholders to enter a period in which they are able to
defend the company from takeovers, most likely through a poison pill style
defence. The Rule would not allow a company to grant a perpetual
permission to defend against takeovers. To prevent a board that had
obtained approval from behaving in a way that is detrimental to the
company, being comfortable in the knowledge that they are safe from a
takeover, certain conditions will be required for the approval to remain
effective. The most obvious of these are: that the share price should remain
above a certain level, that dividends should do likewise, or that they should
not deviate from a particular sectoral benchmark. The last possibility
would be particularly useful as it would not invalidate the approval in
times where, for reasons outside of the board’s control, the sector is unable
to maintain profits or expansion at prior levels. It would be up to the
shareholders to decide which particular measure is suitable.
Implementing the above would allow boards to able to consider a
long-term investment strategy and “pitch” it to shareholders. The pitch
would include what the long-term aim would be, such as increasing market
share, entering a new product or national market, developing a new
technology, investing in more efficient plant machinery, and it would
explain how long the program would be as well as any other relevant
details that the board would be able to disclose without compromising the
strategy itself. The pitch would set out the duration of the approval and the
conditions upon which it would be invalidated, which will be referred to
here as break clauses. Shareholders would then be able to decide whether
they thought the program was worth giving up the ability sell the company
to another. They would consider whether the program was viable and
whether the board was trustworthy, honest, and capable of delivering what
they were proposing. With this information they then decide whether to
grant approval.
While an assessment of the feasibility of the proposed project, the
reasonableness of the assumptions upon which it is based, and appropriate
duration of such a project may be within the realms of calculation for
major institutional shareholders and fund managers, it is clear that such an
assessment may be beyond the ability of many other investors, not least
retail investors. In order to counterbalance this situation it would also be
necessary, when “pitching” a project to shareholders, for shareholders to
appoint by vote an investment bank that investigates the proposal,
produces a report on whether the projections, calculations, assumptions
and time frame are reasonable, and gives an opinion on its overall merit.
The bank would also advise on what sort of break clauses would be
necessary and the appropriate benchmarks upon which to base them. It is
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of paramount importance that it is the shareholders who select the bank, in
order to ensure there is an incentive to investigate fully and effectively to
please shareholders. Selection of the bank by the board would incentivise
the bank to investigate superficially and perhaps optimistically, in a way
that could be argued to currently blight the audit market.120 This would
also provide the additional benefit of giving firms and shareholders the
time to compare the market to get the best deal from banks and ensure that
they have a reasonable period of time to evaluate the potential of the
company carefully; two conditions that are absent when a bank is called
upon to provide advice after a takeover has transpired.121
This leads to the question: why would shareholders give up their
freedom to accept a takeover offer? If UK companies are focused on shortterm results because they wish to protect their position and ergo their
companies from being subject to takeovers, then UK shareholders are in
fact being deprived of greater possible long-term returns, because the
boards are not investing efficiently in order to generate the greatest
possible gain in the long-term. By tying their own and fellow shareholders’
hands from accepting a takeover offer, it liberates the board to focus on
the long-term and generate greater profits. The next logical question is: if
shareholders cannot perceive the long-term value of investments now (and
consequently choose to sell shares into an offer rather than hold them),
why would they choose to approve defensive measures, which would
require them to depend on long-term value creation over and above shortterm gains from potential takeovers? This can be answered by considering
a table similar to the one above, but this time altered to reflect the scenario
under the new non-frustration rule:
Action
Approve

Benefit
Potential
increased
value

Likelihood
Uncertain

Loss
Potential
future
premium

Likelihood
Uncertain

Disapprove

Potential
future
premium

Uncertain

Potential
increased
value

Uncertain

120 Jonathan Ford, A defective auditing market that makes ‘lemons’ of us all, FIN. TIMES
(Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/fddde450-2521-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0#commentsanchor.
121 See Neil Collins, Backing GKN management will be leap of faith for shareholders, FIN.
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2018) https://www.ft.com/content/48b715f8-2844-11e8-9274-2b13fccdc744 (“[T]he
[target company], like a man with raging toothache, was not in a strong position to haggle over the
fees and the idea that the final offer ‘fundamentally undervalues’ this venerable business . . . is mere
takeover rhetoric from a board that can hardly know whether it does or not.”).
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Comparing the tables, the difference becomes obvious. First,
when considering pre-approval for a takeover defence, the benefits and
losses incurred by the shareholder are now on an equal footing; the
increase in the company’s value is uncertain, but the existence of a future
takeover premium is uncertain also.122 The magnitude of any future
takeover premium is also uncertain. Instantly, there is a change in the
dynamics of the decision, the shareholder now considers two possible
future scenarios, both of which are uncertain. Further, the insights of
behavioural economics explain why there is another significant
consideration. For this, we can look back at our example of Cole Ltd.
Under current rules,123 Cole Ltd.’s share price increases from £1.00 to
£1.25 when the offer is made and so, shareholders have £1.25 share value
which if rejected, falls to £1.00. They are being asked whether they want
to lose that same value by refusing the offer or potentially make greater
gains in future. This is undesirable decision to give the investor because
common sense shows that there is a greater dislike of losses as opposed to
gains. This means they will be disproportionately concerned about losing
the 25p value they already have thanks to the bid, as opposed to gaining
25p more at a later date.
Now contrast this situation to the decision under the new rule.124
Under the new rule, Cole Ltd. has not yet undergone any offer. Its share
price is around £1.00 and has been trading so for a while. Consequently,
when the board asks for an eight-year approval of takeover defences for
the purpose of investing in the latest plant machinery or expanding into a
growing foreign market, the question posed to shareholders is whether
they would rather seek to gain future profits through the company
generating value or seek to gain a future premium through a takeover.
There is no loss aversion because no actual loss will take place,125 their
decision will essentially be between two competing types of gain, both of
which at the point of decision making are hypothetical. The only losses are
indirect, and are opportunity costs. This contrasts strongly with the
original scenario where seeking long term value generation would lead to
an immediate loss from the shareholders’ endowment as the share price
drops reflecting the rejection of the takeover.
122 The level of certainty could be drastically different, but this would be for the shareholder
to consider in each individual circumstance. Where the chance of generating value is low and the
chance of a takeover premium high, shareholders will naturally refuse to approve takeover defences.
Likewise, when the chance of generating value is high and the chance of a takeover premium is low,
the shareholders will be more likely to approve takeover defences.
123 See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
124 See supra Section II.B.
125 It is reasonable to expect that an approval of takeover defences will cause an opportunity
loss that could be reflected in the share price, however, assuming that the shareholders have only
approved takeover defences on the condition of investment that will lead to a commensurate increase
in long term, value in these should balance out and the share price will remain largely stable.
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Graph 2

Graph 3
Reconsidering the graph originally shown above as Graph 1 (now
labelled Graph 2 for easy comparison), we can now compare it to the
situation where takeover defences are prohibited and compare it to the
situation where the new model described above has been implemented. In
Graph 2, Point “a” is when an offer is made, Point “b” is when a
shareholder has to decide whether to accept an offer, Point “c” is when a
rejected bid is dropped, and Point “d” is where the board predicts the share
price will be if the company is not taken over. As before, even if the
shareholder thinks a bid undervalues the company, their risk aversion will
naturally incline them towards avoiding the drop in value of the shares
they already have rather than pursuing a possible gain in future, even if
they are around the same level.
Now the situation can be contrasted by looking at Graph 3. In this
situation, before any takeover is announced, the investor has to decide
whether to allow takeover defences. This is marked at Point “b.” Although
when making the decision, the investor has to consider that at any point
between Point “b” and “d,” a takeover offer could be made which could
allow them to benefit from an offer premium. Although this time, no
endowment effect is possible because the bid premium has not yet come
into existence. The shareholder has to decide on the current value of the
shares compared to a hypothetical share premium that has not come into
existence and consequently cannot exert an endowment effect upon the
shareholder. A present bias would also have limited effect, since there
would be no immediate benefit to selling the shares above and beyond the
normal benefit of selling an investment. Here, all potential premiums
would be in the future, thus exerting a weaker influence on the investor to
overvalue immediate gains. By constraining these irrational biases, market
actors should be able to behave more rationally and allow the market to
function more efficiently.
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This reform will also likely help the situation of the fund manager
who is so concerned with their relative performance that they would sell
into an offer that they believe undervalues the company. This is because
the fund manager has to determine whether the firm in which they have
invested their capital is able to deliver the higher returns that they are
seeking to obtain during the proposed protected period. The fund manager
does not need to worry about their relative performance come the next
benchmarking period, because whether they approve takeover defences or
not, there will be no immediate drastic change in the price of the shares in
the same way that there would be if they held shares in a firm that had
rejected a takeover offer. Therefore, whether the approval is given or not,
it will not impact their position relative to competitor fund managers.
C. The effect of implementation on boards and shareholders
There are a number of effects that would be expected from the
implementation of this change in the takeover rules. Primarily, it should
decrease the pressure on UK companies to focus on the short-term and
allow them to look further into the horizon when making plans relating to
investment and the use of capital generally. It will be likely to also
generate other positive effects, which are especially desirable in light of
the UK’s productivity problem. Such a change in the Takeover Code will
create an obvious incentive for boards to actively search out and find
programs of investment that will give them a basis for seeking approval
from shareholders to employ takeover defences. The motive behind this
may be to protect their own position as best they can; as once they have
received approval from their shareholders to use takeover defences, their
own position is better secured. This may at first instance cause a number
of investment programs to be presented and accepted that in time do not
provide the fruits that were promised, but with time, the number of such
programs should reduce and reach a low equilibrium. The reason for this
is that once a program is agreed upon as a justification for approving
takeover defences, it will be only a matter of time until the approval has
run its course and the results are expected. Should those results not be
secured, this will inevitably have a significant impact upon the trust the
shareholders place in the board. Whether the board could not deliver
because they deliberately misled shareholders or because, despite their
best efforts, they simply could not deliver what they thought possible, it
will mean that in the future, shareholders will be less likely to trust the
verity of their statements as well as their competence to deliver results.
This will likely mean the board will be less able to convince shareholders
to permit further approvals for employing takeover defences and should
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an offer arise, shareholders will be far less likely to believe the board when
they say that they should not take the offer. This then will provide its own
disincentive to misuse the approval process by inventing unrealistic,
overly optimistic or false programmes of investment. To rephrase the
words of John Smith: “[i]t is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer, or the baker, that we expect their plans of investment to be well
considered and effective, but from their regard to their own interest.”126
It is also worth noting that such a reform will have a limited effect
on the openness of UK businesses to inward investment and beneficial
takeovers. First, friendly takeovers would not be inhibited. Second, due to
the temporary nature of the protection, shareholders will never be
prevented from taking advantage of takeovers on a lasting basis. This is
essential for two reasons: first, as described above, this ensures that
company boards have an incentive only to pursue genuine investment
programmes and, second, where firms persistently fail to innovate, it is
essential these firms can be taken over and replaced with new management
as expected within the market for corporate control.127 This is made all the
more important by the findings by Bloom and Van Reenen that low
productivity is most pronounced in sectors where competition is weak.128
Where there is little competition, it is all the more important that the threat
of a new foreign entrant (for example, via acquiring an existing
competitor) or the threat of a takeover drives the board of a company to
continue to innovate and boost productivity. Notably however, with the
proposed change, there should not be a drastic closing off of the market
for corporate control within the UK, rather the timing and organisation of
such takeovers will alter.
These measures would therefore change the nature of takeover
decision-making. Simply by altering the timing of the shareholders’
decision on whether to seek value generation or takeover premiums the
rule change would put the shareholder into a position where they are likely
to make more rational decisions. They would be comparing ‘like with like’
rather than long-term uncertain gains with almost certain short-term
losses. As a consequence, whether the shareholder is a fund-manager or a
retail investor their decision is more likely to be rational because they will
balance the potential gains from either approving or disapproving takeover
defences equally rather than being subject to, what is from an economic
point of view, irrational loss aversion.

126 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1904) (“It is not from
the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their
regard to their own interest.”).
127 Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 THE J. OF POL.
ECON. 110 (1965).
128 Nicholas Bloom & John Van Reenen, Measuring and Explaining Management
Practices Across Firms and Countries, 122 Q. J. OF ECON. 1351 (2007). See also Andy Haldane, Chief
Economist, Bank of Eng., Productivity Puzzles Speech at LSE (Mar. 20, 2017).
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CONCLUSION
It has been seen that the UK takeover regulation appears to cause
a focus on short-term profits potentially damaging long-term investment,
which appears to be harming research and development while also causing
low productivity growth in UK businesses. A number of possible answers
to this problem have been considered including government intervention,
disenfranchising shareholders, and increasing the acceptance threshold for
takeover acceptance. While each of these proposals have their own merits
and de-merits, it has been argued that they are insufficient for the present
purposes.
A new solution has been presented that harnesses the insights from
behavioural economics. Under this new solution, prior to any takeover bid,
a company’s board has the opportunity to present to shareholders a
program of investment that they believe would greatly increase the value
of their company in the medium to long-term. If shareholders consider this
program sufficiently convincing and sufficiently profitable, they can
acquiesce to a period of time where the board can implement the
investment program and where necessary, implement takeover defences
so that they are not at risk of being subject to a takeover simply because
they have chosen to implement a long-term profitability strategy.
It is argued that should such a policy be implemented, both
research and development as well as investment will increase within UK
companies and productivity will also increase in the medium to longer
term after implementation. An increase in both investment and research
and development would be likely to have a significant positive effect on
productivity growth. As a result, this would help increase the standard of
living, increase economic growth, and make the UK more competitive
internationally. It would also ease the concerns of firms so that they would
not feel it necessary to move to other jurisdictions where firms are more
protected, and it would also do little to undermine the efficacy of the
market for corporate control as a mechanism for maximising business
efficiency.

